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Summary of Argument 
Plaintiff-Appellant Nelda Johnson was injured when she tripped and 
fell on broken asphalt in the parking lot at the health spa of Appellee Gold's 
Gym. Appellee Peay Investments is the owner of the parking lot. The gym 
has a contract duty with the owner to maintain the parking lot. The trial 
court granted summary judgment and dismissed the cause of action. It held 
a preinjury release in the membership agreement barred Appellant Johnson 
from recovery against Appellee Gold's Gym. It also held that the only 
breach of Appellees in causing the injuries was in their failure to maintain 
the parking lot. Then it reasoned that Appellant Johnson could not recover 
under this cause of action because it is precluded by Goebel v. SLC SRR Co,, 
2004 UT 80, 104 P.3d 1185, because Appellant Johnson failed to show that 
Appellees had knowledge of the defective pavement and a chance to cure it 
before her injuries. 
Summary judgment was in error because the preinjury release is not 
clearly stated and it is ambiguous because it does not refer to injuries in the 
parking lot. Also, the release is against public policy because it decreases a 
storeowner's responsibility to maintain its parking lot, it penalized a 
business invitee compared to the general public, and it says the storeowner's 
permanent duty to invitees to maintain its parking lot can be waived. 
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Also, summary judgment should be reversed because the trial court 
erred as a matter of law. His ruling overlooked the legal duty a landowner 
or possessor owes its invitees to anticipate danger and make the property 
safe for them as stated in the Restatement 2d of Torts, Section 343. The 
trial court's misfocus on whether the Appellees had knowledge of the defect 
and a chance to fix it before the injury erroneously precluded Appellant 
Johnson from presenting evidence of constructive notice, or of a breach of 
the duty to make the property safe for invitees. 
Finally, this matter should be remanded because the trial court abused 
its discretion in denying experts, in issuing orders after a notice of appeal 
was filed that deprived the trial court of further jurisdiction, and in sending 
this matter to American Fork, after it was filed and pending in Provo for 
over two years. 
I. The Trial Court erred in ruling that Appellant Johnson 
released Appellee Gym for injuries in its parking lot when she 
signed the membership agreement 
When the appellate court reviews the trial judge's ruling for its 
correctness in denying summary judgment it does so without according 
deference to its legal conclusions. " Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ewart, 
2007 UT 52,1| 2, 167 P.3d 1011; Johnson v. Hermes Assocs., Ltd., 2005 UT 
82, 12, 128 P.3d 1151. The "facts and all reasonable inferences drawn 
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therefrom are examined in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 
Ewart, supra. Appellee Gold's Gym, in its Response Brief at 9, in 
discussing the standard of review, failed to state that in reviewing this ruling 
for correctness, that this Court should not give any deference to the trial 
judge's ruling on summary judgment. The trial court erred as a matter of 
law in granting summary judgment and holding the preinjury release in the 
health spa's membership agreement was an enforceable preinjury release of 
injuries suffered due to an unsafe parking lot. Appellee Gold's Gym 
discusses this issue third in its brief Appellee's Brief at 33-40. 
In Rothstein v. Snowbird Corp. 2007 UT 96, t 6, 175 P.3d 560, the 
Court analyzed the effect of a prerelease of liability in for a ski resort. The 
Court held the prerelease was invalid because it violated public policy. But 
it also recognized it would not enforce a release that is not clearly stated and 
unambiguous. The Court stated: 
[2] [3] f^ 6 Preinjury releases from liability for one's negligence 
pit two bedrock legal concepts against one another: the right to 
order one's relationship with another by contract and the 
obligation to answer in damages when one injures another by 
breaching a duty of care. E.g., Berry v. Greater Park City Co., 
2007 UT 87, f 12, 171 P.3d 442. We have joined the majority 
of jurisdictions in permitting people to surrender their rights to 
recover in tort for the negligence of others. Id. f 15. We have 
made it clear throughout our preinjury release jurisprudence, 
however, that contract cannot claim victory over tort in every 
instance. We have indicated that releases that are not 
sufficiently clear and unambiguous cannot be enforced. 
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Hawkins v. Pearl, 2001 UT 94, % 9 n. 3, 37 P.3d 1062. We have 
also indicated that we would refuse to enforce releases that 
offend public policy. Id. f 9. We do not explore the clarity with 
which Snowbird communicated to Mr. Rothstein its intention to 
release itself of liability for its negligence because we conclude 
that the releases offend the public policy of this state as 
articulated by the Legislature. 
The preinjury release of Appellee Gold's Gym is not clear and 
unambiguous, and it violates public policy. 
A. The Release is ambiguous, not clear and unequivocal and is 
unenforceable. 
The contract must not be enforced because it is ambiguous, and not 
clear and unequivocal in providing a preinjury release to Gold's Gym from 
claims for its negligent failure to maintain the parking lot. The preinjury 
release must be clear and unequivocal. It states that Johnson "holds the 
Gym, its employees and agents harmless from all claims" 
and that "the Gym shall not be liable to [Johnson] for any claims, demands, 
injuries, 
damages or actions arising due to injury." ; and finally, that Gold's is not 
liable for "any claims, demands, injuries, damages or actions arising out of 
or in connection with the use by [Johnson] of the services and facilities or 
the premises where the same is located..." 
(emphasis added). 
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Gold's Gym, at page 35, argues that the contract clearly and 
unequivocally releases it from its own negligence in maintaining the parking 
lot. But the pre injury release never once uses the word negligence or 
parking lot. The preinjury release is contained in the Clause called 
"Assumption of the Risk and Risk of Accident." The context of the 
paragraph helps understand what risk is being assumed, and what claims are 
being released. See Appellant Johnson's Addendum, last page; and 
Appellee's Brief, Ex. C, p. 5. The assumption of the risk clause clearly 
relates to the consumer when she uses the equipment, gets consulting on 
exercise routines, or overexerts herself. It shifts the duty to the consumer to 
protect herself when she chooses to exercise. But it does not shift the duty 
to protect herself to when she walks in the parking lot. 
Furthermore, the preinjury release is ambiguous. Gold's Gym argues 
that Appellant Johnson has failed to show the word has two different 
meanings so it is not ambiguous. Appellee's Brief at 35. But the contract 
shows the word premises does not mean the parking lot. The word is used 
three times in the "Rules and Regulations" part of the contract. It says, "1 . 
Hours. The hours of operation shall be posted on the premises." It also 
says, "4. Lockers. ... Do not bring valuables to the premises. And finally, 
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it says, "7. Day Care. Day Care is provided only while the member is on 
the gym premises." See Appellant Johnson's Addendum, last page. 
How is the word "premises" interpreted in these other contract 
provisions? Can the word "parking lot" be used to replace the word and 
give the rules the same meaning? For example, if parking lot is replaced for 
premises in rule 7 it means that day care is provided while the member uses 
the parking lot outside. The member would not even need to go inside the 
gym. But this interpretation is absurd because the gym wants the parent 
available, in the gym where the parent could be found, if there is a problem 
with the child in the daycare. Likewise, the hours of operation are not 
posted in the parking lot, but on the building, on the entry door, or inside the 
gym. Finally, when the gym provides lockers is it really trying to regulate 
and restrict patron from bringing valuables in their car and leaving them 
outside? Premises does not clearly refer to the parking lot. It only refers to 
the building. 
The word "premises" is ambiguous. It is used in Utah law to define 
the tenant rights in a residential rental unit. Utah Fit Premises Act, Utah 
Code, Section 57-22-1 et seq. If the word refers to rental units, to a building 
on land in a fire insurance contract, or to the gym in a Health spa's 
membership contract, there is no way it is unambiguous if claimed that it 
8 
refers to a parking lot. The trial court erred because it concluded that the 
word "premises" clearly and unequivocally, or unambiguously means that 
the parties to the membership agreement intended to give a preinjury release 
for any injury that may arise in the parking lot. This legal conclusion is 
incorrect. 
B. The Preinjury Release is Against Public Policy and 
Unenforceable. 
Gold's Gym erroneously claims there is no applicable public policy 
which renders the subject release entered into by an adult to become a 
member of a private gym unenforceable. Appellee's Brief, p. 39. This claim 
is wrong. The health spa industry is clearly regulated. See Utah Code, 
Section 13-23-1, et seq. The purpose for the regulation is to protect the 
consumer against the health spas. Gold's Gym is clearly a health spa 
because it charges a fee for exercise and is an exercise gym. Id., Section 13-
23-2(3)(a). The primary protection given by the law is in the regulation of 
the contract. Section 13-23-3, -4. With regard to the preinjury release, the 
law says the contract shall "clearly state any rules of the health spa that 
apply to the consumer's use of its facilities and services." Id., Section 13-
23-3(4). Another example of how the law regulates the contract is in the 
duration of the contract. A contract cannot last for more than 36 months. Id, 
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Sec. 13-23-3(3). The legislature specifically intended to protect Appellant 
Johnson from abuse in the contract used by Appellee Gold's Gym. 
The absence of a specific paragraph in the law that prohibits preinjury 
release clauses in the membership agreement does not mean the clause is 
permissible. If the legislature had specifically said it is illegal to include a 
preinjury release for injuries arising in a parking lot, then there would be no 
need for the judicial power to interpret what clauses are against public 
policy. The legislature clearly intended to regulate health spa contracts to 
protect the consumers. The Court should exercise its power to find that a 
preinjury release of claims arising from negligent maintenance of the 
parking lot is an impermissible contract clause in the health spa membership 
contract. 
The abusive nature of this contract is clear on its face. The Gold's 
Gym contract is unenforceable. It does not clearly state what service is 
provided in exchange for a fee. The contract is totally silent and fails to 
recite any consideration given by Gold's Gym in exchange for the payments 
it will require from the customers. The contract automatically renews 
forever, it makes the customer assume all risk for using the equipment and 
facilities, and the customer releases all claims that arise out of the use of the 
equipment, facilities. The contract says it automatically renews and 
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continues on a month-to-month basis until a 30-day advance written notice is 
received by Gold's Gym. Then it adds, "Monthly dues must be current to 
terminate. Buyer owes all monthly dues until proper cancellation procedures 
have been followed." Finally, the contract adds, uThis agreement is "NON-
RENEWABLE if this box is checked." See Appellee's Brief, Exhibit C, 
pgs. 6-7. 
The contract of Appellee Gold's Gym is absolutely contrary to law. 
Section 13-23-3, Utah Code, states, "A contract may not have a term in 
excess of 36 months, but the contract may provide that the consumer may 
exercise an option to renew the term after its expiration." Utah Code, 
Section 13-23-3(3). Appellee's contract renews automatically. It extends 
beyond three years. It allows the consumer the right to exercise an option to 
cancel the contract, not to renew it. Then it restricts the validity of the notice 
of cancellation to when the contract is current, when all dues are paid, and 
when written notice is received at the corporate office. These clauses are all 
in violation of the state law. The legislature clearly intended to regulate this 
contract to protect the consumer from Gold's Gym. 
This Court should find that the preinjury release of claims in the 
parking lot is against public policy because it allows Gold's Gym to ignore 
its duty to maintain the parking lot. The preinjury release clause in the 
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contract takes away the gym's duty to maintain its parking lot, which is 
owed to business invitees, patrons who pay for the membership, and who 
should be protected, but leaves the duty in place to members of the public 
who never use the gym but who use the parking lot. Gold's Gym has 
gambled based on this release of liability and decided that it did not need to 
maintain the parking lot because it has releases from its patrons. This 
strategy puts others who are not customers of Gold's Gym in danger. This 
impermissible shifting of duty is illogical and contrary to the greater duty 
owed to business invitees. The preinjury release is against public policy. 
II. Appellant Johnson's claim of injury from an unsafe condition 
on property does not arise from a temporary condition on 
property and she does not have to prove that Appellees had 
notice and a reasonable time to fix the unsafe condition as a 
precondition to Appellees' liability. 
Appellee Gold's Gym suggests the standard of review on the issue of 
whether the broken asphalt was a temporary or permanent condition is one 
to be reviewed for correctness. Appellee Brief at 1. Appellee Gold's Gym 
discusses this issue first in its brief. Appellee's Brief at 21-25. But 
correctness means there is no deference to the lower court's legal 
conclusions. It also must include that all facts are to be viewed in the light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party. Hale v. Beckstead, 2005 UT 24, 116 
P.3d 263. The law of premises liability states the duty of a business to its 
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invitees. This duty is based on the assumption that the storeowner has 
greater liability to the invitee because it possesses greater knowledge about 
the condition of its property and has no reason to believe the invitee will 
discover the condition or realize the risk. The business has superior 
knowledge of the existence of a condition on its property that could subject 
an invitee to unreasonable risk of injury. 
Appellee Gold's Gym and the trial court have taken this case in the 
wrong direction. They have analyzed this issue exclusively under GoebeL 
Memo Dec, dated 09/17/2007, at 7 to 10; Appellee's Brief at 24-25. They 
erroneously compared a defective parking lot with cracks and potholes to the 
mats that abutted the railroad tracks in GoebeL They reasoned that since the 
defect arose from lack of maintenance that any premises liability is judged 
by the standards like a grape on the floor of a store. They argue that since 
the conditions are temporary that Appellant Johnson had to show that 
Appellee Gold's Gym had knowledge of the defect and time to cure it before 
it may be liable in negligence. This legal conclusion is erroneous. 
Appellees' analysis is erroneous. Appellant Johnson, in her brief at 33-37, 
points out the major flaw in the trial court's rationale. This case involves 
premises liability of Gold's Gym to its business invitees. In Goebel, there 
was no direct duty owed by the railroad company to the injured plaintiff, it 
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was not responsible for the unsafe condition, it did not create it, and its only 
duty was to maintain it. But Appellant Johnson is a business invitee. 
Appellees owe her a duty to protect her on their property. Appellant 
Johnson pointed out the importance of Restatement 2d Section 343, and 
compared it with Section 342. The former section clearly defines the duty a 
business owes to its business invitees in premises liability. See Appellant's 
Brief at 33-37. The Restatement defines the duty of care owed by a 
landowner to an invitee. Hale v. Beckstead, 2005 UT 24, 116 P.3d 263. 
Section 343, Restatement 2d of Torts, is the law in Utah. Appellee Gold's 
Gym refuses to acknowledge this Utah law. It totally ignores the 2005 case 
of Hale v. Beckstead, 2005 UT 24, 116 P.3d 263, where the Utah Supreme 
Court reversed the trial court and the Court of Appeals to emphasis the 
importance of the duty the landowner owes to the business invitee. 
Plaintiff Hale was hired to paint the Beckstead house. Hale fell off an 
unprotected balcony on the second floor. The trial court granted summary 
judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed 
and remanded on writ of certiorari. It concluded that the open and obvious 
danger rule, as embodied in the Second Restatement of Torts, was the 
applicable law governing landowners' duties to invitees. The Supreme Court 
stated: 
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in Utah, any reference in this opinion to the "open and obvious 
danger rule" is simply a reference to Restatement sections 343 
and 343 A, not the common law doctrine that the Restatement 
replaced. 
... Under the common law rule, the presence of an open 
and obvious danger acted as an absolute bar to an injured 
invitee's recovery. The Restatement rule, however, is different 
in two ways. First, it defines the duty of care landowners owe; 
it does not excuse failure to comply with that duty because of 
the obviousness of a danger. Second, it includes a number of 
exceptions that allow an invitee to recover under certain 
circumstances. 
Thus, the applicable law is found in sections 343 and 
343 A, comprising Title E, "Special Liability of Possessors of 
Land to Invitees." Title E, as its name indicates, simply defines 
the duty of care a landowner owes to invitees on his property, 
and is broken into two sections that must be read together. See 
Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 343, cmt. a (1965) ("This section should be read 
together with § 343A."). Section 343, "Dangerous Conditions 
Known to or Discoverable by Possessor," reads: 
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm 
caused to his invitees by a condition on the land if, but only if, 
he (a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would 
discover the condition, and should realize that it involves an 
unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and(b) should 
expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or will 
fail to protect themselves against it, and (c) fails to exercise 
reasonable care to protect them against the danger. Id. § 343 
(emphasis added). 
Section 343 A, entitled "Known or Obvious Dangers," 
reads: 
(1) A possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for physical 
harm caused to them by any activity or condition on the land 
whose danger is known or obvious to them, unless the 
possessor should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or 
obviousness. 
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(2) In determining whether the possessor should anticipate 
harm from a known or obvious danger, the fact that the invitee 
is entitled to make use of public land, or of the facilities of a 
public utility, is a factor of importance indicating that the harm 
should be anticipated. 
Id § 343A. 
Under the comparative fault system now in effect, on the 
other hand, "the fault of a person seeking recovery shall not 
alone bar recovery by that person." Id. § 78-27-38(1). This 
comparative fault scheme allows an injured party to seek 
recovery against any defendant whose fault exceeds his own. 
Id. § 78-27-38(2). The amount the plaintiff can recover is 
proportionate to the percentage of fault attributed to the 
defendant. M § 78-27-40(1). 
Id. p. 4. 
The Restatement version of the open and obvious danger 
rule also does not act as a complete bar to the recovery of a 
plaintiff injured as a result of another's negligence. This is so 
because the Restatement sections 343 and 3 43 A, unlike the 
affirmative defenses discussed above, defines the duty of care a 
possessor of land owes to invitees. It does not excuse 
negligence; it defines it. Where an invitee is injured by a 
condition on land from which the possessor did not owe a duty 
to protect the invitee, the possessor commits no negligence. 
Thus, the rule does not operate to allow a landowner to act 
negligently and remain free from liability so long as his 
negligence was obvious to those who were injured thereby. 
Instead, it is a duty-defining rule that simply states that, under 
appropriate circumstances, a landowner's duty of care might not 
include warning or otherwise protecting visitors from obvious 
dangers. 
Id., p. 4. 
Under section 343, if a landowner "should expect that [an 
invitee] will. . . fail to protect [himself] against [a dangerous 
condition]," the landowner must exercise reasonable care to 
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protect him. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343(b), (c). 
Again, under section 343 A, a landowner has a duty to protect 
his invitees from obviously harmful conditions or activities on 
the property if the landowner "should anticipate the harm" 
despite the obvious nature of the danger. Id § 343A(1). Where 
an "invitee's attention may be distracted, such that he will not 
discover what is obvious, or will forget what he has discovered, 
or fail to protect himself against it," a possessor of land may be 
liable for breaching his duty of care if he fails "to warn . . . or to 
take other reasonable steps to protect [the invitee]." Id. § 343A 
cmt. 1(f). A possessor of land may also be liable for injuries an 
invitee sustains if the possessor has reason to believe that "the 
invitee will proceed to encounter the known or obvious danger 
because to a reasonable man in his position the advantages of 
doing so would outweigh the apparent risk." Id. While the 
invitee may also share responsibility for his injuries, he may 
still recover from the defendant in proportion to the defendant's 
fault. Importantly, the invitee's negligence is "not. . . 
conclusive in determining the duty of the possessor, or whether 
he has acted reasonably under the circumstances." 
Id. at P. 5. 
A number of states handle cases concerning defects in sidewalks or 
parking lots under the openness and obviousness of the condition. This logic 
comes directly from Section 343 of the Restatement 2d of Torts. See Kroger 
v. Cellan, 560 S.W.2d 505 (Tex.Civ.App.1978). The possessor or 
landowner of the land open to business invitees must anticipate potential 
harm, even where the invitee might be aware of the hazard. Corbin v. 
Mann's International Meat Specialties, Inc., 214 Neb. 222, 333 N.W.2d 668 
(Neb. 1983). 
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In this case, the trial court erroneously concluded that any allegation 
of failure to maintain the parking lot meant that Appellant Johnson had to 
show that the Appellees knew of the defects and had sufficient time to 
correct them before she could maintain a cause of action. This ruling is 
contrary to the law of premises liability that dictates that the business owner 
owes a duty to anticipate and prevent the danger for its invitees. The rule 
prevents comparative fault analysis in premises liability if the invitee cannot 
show the business had knowledge and a chance to cure any defect. 
Appellant Johnson should be entitled to show at trial that Appellee Gold's 
Gym failed to exercise reasonable care to anticipate danger to her caused by 
the parking lot, failed to take reasonable steps to maintain it and to protect 
her, and may be liable for her injuries caused by the parking lot. The trial 
court's grant of summary judgment should be reversed. 
III. The trial court erred in finding there is no factual issue on 
whether the defendants had constructive notice of the unsafe 
condition of the parking lot 
Appellee Gold's Gym incorrectly states the standard of review for this issue. 
It discusses this issue in its brief under "Issue No. 2". Appellee Brief at 2-3; 
26-33, It claims the trial court ruling on whether there was constructive 
notice must be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. This claim is false. 
The issue was decided on summary judgment. The facts must be viewed in 
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the light most favorable to Appellant Johnson, the nonmoving party. 
Appellee Gold's Gym claims the trial judge admitted as uncontroverted the 
facts because Appellant Johnson did not specifically controvert them. Id. 
The trial court's Memorandum Decision, dated September 17, 2007, is 
the first document in Appellant Johnson's Addendum. The opinion is 
absolutely silent about the trial court finding that the Appellant failed to 
controvert any fact concerning constructive notice. No fact, listed by the 
trial court, refers to constructive notice. Appellee Gold's Gym finds its 
contention in footnote 1. There, the court stated, "In this case, the court 
could deem all of defendant's facts admitted by plaintiffs wholesale failure 
to follow Rule 7(c)(3)(B)." Appellant Johnson disagrees with this statement 
by the trial court. But the assertion is irrelevant. The trial court states 
eleven facts that it considers uncontroverted. But not one of those facts 
deals with constructive notice. Fact no. 7, states "defendants had never 
observed or been made aware of any dangerous condition, either cracks or 
holes, existing within the asphalt parking lot." This fact simply denies 
knowledge of a dangerous condition, and a chance to fix it, before plaintiff 
was injured. It does not deny that Appellee Gold's Gym failed to meet its 
duty owed to a business invitee to inspect the property, anticipate dangers to 
its invitees, and correct the problems. Constructive notice is a legal 
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conclusion that knowledge is imputed to a defendant because of its conduct. 
The trial court, on page 10 of 11, of its memorandum decision, gave brief 
mention to constructive notice. But it found that Goebel controlled the 
analysis and dictated summary judgment. 
The trial court stated, "And while plaintiff has implied that defendants 
did not conduct reasonable inspections of the parking lot, plaintiff has 
produced no evidence to that effect." Memo. Dec. at 10 of 11. This 
statement by the trial court shows it did not view evidence in the light most 
favorable to Appellant Johnson. It ignored the facts that the pavement was 
not patched in four years after Appellant Johnson's injury; Gold's Gym 
never trained anyone to repair or recognize a damaged condition in the 
pavement; and it failed to disclose the name of the party who patched some 
of the asphalt one year before the injury. Appellant's Brief at 38 to 40, and 
14-20. Most importantly, constructive notice is a legal consequence 
imposed on a business when it failed to exercise reasonable care to discover 
the unsafe condition on its property. The trial court's error in granting 
summary judgment on the issue of constructive notice is not evaluated by an 
abuse of discretion standard, it is a legal error, entitled to no deference by 
this Court. It should be reversed because the facts, when viewed in the light 
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most favorable to Appellant Johnson, create an issue of whether Appellee 
Gold's Gym had constructive notice of the dangerous parking lot. 
IV. The trial court was the improper venue to 
decide the motion for summary judgment. 
Appellant Johnson timely raised her objection to having the matter 
tried in American Fork. The complaint was filed on April 13, 2005. RP at 
1-4. Judge Howard filed his notice of recusal and transfer on May 15, 2007. 
He sent the case from Provo, where it was filed and pending for over two 
years, to American Fork, while a motion for summary judgment was 
pending. The motion for summary judgment was filed in Provo on April 4, 
2007. Appellant Johnson filed her motion to extend time to designate 
experts in Provo, on April 25, 2007. Then, the trial court in American Fork 
ruled on the motion in early July, and gave Appellant Johnson less than one 
week to respond to summary judgment. There was no time in this process to 
challenge the transfer of the case to American Fork. Plaintiff raised the 
issue on October 10, 2007, just three months after it had to respond to 
summary judgment, and just a little over four months after it knew its case, 
and pending motions, were sent to American Fork. Appellant Johnson 
timely complained of this transfer. The matter should be remanded to Provo 
for trial. 
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V. The trial court abused its discretion in striking Appellant 
Johnson's experts witnesses. 
Whether the trial court may strike the experts was within its 
discretion. But its abuse of discretion is shown by its lack of fairness in the 
use of its power. Appellant Johnson filed a motion to compel because the 
defendants did not answer discovery. When Appellee Peay Investments 
answered almost two months late, after the discovery deadline had passed, it 
objected to virtually every interrogatory and request for production. 
Appellant Johnson complained that the late answers meant Appellee Peay 
Investments had waived the right to raise objections because it did not raise 
them in the time period in which it could object. It had to provide 
information. The trial court never ruled on the motion to compel. It simply 
ruled to strike plaintiffs experts. 
Appellant Johnson has not attempted to circumvent the purpose of 
Rule 26, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. She requested more time to identify 
experts and then respond to summary judgment because of the defendant's 
abuse of discovery. Also, Appellee Gold's Gym did not answer discovery in 
a meaningful way so Appellant Johnson could inform, educated, select and 
identify her experts. The Appellees never identified anyone who had 
knowledge about the condition of the asphalt, made repairs to it, or 
?2 
maintained it. It was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to strike the 
experts. 
VI. The trial court was without jurisdiction to enter an order on 
the motion to reconsider or on defendant's motion to strike 
Plaintiffs photographs and erroneously seeks to impose a rule 
barring any pre-final-judgment motions to reconsider. 
The trial court committed legal error in entering a ruling on the 
motion to reconsider and its ruling is entitled to no deference by this Court. 
Its ruling of November 29, 2007, came after Appellant Johnson filed her 
notice of appeal on November 17, 2007. The trial court had no jurisdiction 
to issue the November 29 ruling. Appellant Johnson would have to file a 
new notice of appeal to contest the later ruling. It could not wait until 
December 28, 2007, to file a notice of appeal. Fair play has to restrict the 
issues to those in play by October 18, 2007. 
The trial court's memorandum decision was issued on September 17, 
2007. Appellant Johnson filed her motion to reconsider on October 10, 
2007. This motion was filed before a final order on summary judgment was 
entered to provide a basis for appeal, which was entered October 18, 2007. 
Appellant Johnson's motion challenged a pre-final judgment ruling. It was 
proper to correct errors before the parties had to go through a lengthy, costly 
appeal process. See Gillett v. Price, 2006 UT 24. 
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But it was totally improper for the trial court to then issue a decision 
after appeal was already filed. The trial court was divested of jurisdiction 
once the appeal was filed. 
The motion filed by Appellee Gold's Gym on November 14, 2007, 
was a post-final judgment motion that is prohibited by Gillett. Here, 
Appellant Johnson no longer had any opportunity to reply to the defendant's 
response. The case was no longer pending with the trial court. All rulings in 
the November 29 ruling are without jurisdiction, improper, and should not 
be binding in subsequent proceedings. 
IN CONCLUSION, 
Summary judgment was improper in this cause of action. The trial 
court legally erred in ignoring premises liability law that imposes on 
Appellees the duty to make their property safe for their invitees. Appellant 
Johnson was injured because of the breach of that duty. The trial court 
rejected that duty and required that Appellant Johnson show that Appellees 
had knowledge and a chance to fix any dangerous condition before they 
could be liable. The trial court also legally erred in precluding a claim for 
constructive notice of the defective parldng lot by finding Appellant Johnson 
failed to show they knew about the defects and had time to fix them. But 
constructive notice is a legal finding, not a factual finding, where knowledge 
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is imputed to Appellees because of their negligence in maintaining and 
inspecting the parking lot, and in failing to provide information about their 
knowledge. 
Additionally, the summary judgment was legally erroneous because it 
was based on a preinjury release in the membership agreement. The release 
is void because it is not clear, it is ambiguous, and it violates public policy. 
Also, it does not release Appellee Peay Investments, who is the owner of the 
parking lot because it is only in the membership agreement between 
Appellant Johnson and Appellee Gold's Gym. 
Finally, the trial court was without jurisdiction to enter its order on 
November 29, 2007, because it was entered 12 days after the notice of 
appeal divested it of jurisdiction. Also, the trial court abused its discretion in 
striking the experts of Appellant Johnson. The summary judgment order 
should be reversed and this matter should be remanded to Provo for further 
proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted, 
S. Austin Johnson 
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